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Abstract 
Surprise is often defined in terms of disconfirmed 
expectations, whereby the surprisingness of an event is 
thought to be dependent on the degree to which that event 
contrasts with a more likely, or expected, outcome. We 
propose that surprise is more accurately modelled as a 
manifestation of an ongoing sense-making process. 
Specifically, the level of surprise experienced depends on the 
extent to which an event necessitates representational 
updating. This sense-making view predicts that differences in 
subjective probability and surprise arise because of 
differences in representational specificity rather than 
differences between an expectation and an outcome. We 
describe two experiments which support this hypothesis. The 
results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that generalised 
representations can allow subjectively low probability 
outcomes to be integrated without eliciting high levels of 
surprise, thus providing an explanation for the difference 
between the two measures. The results of Experiment 2 reveal 
that the level of contrast between expectation and outcome is 
not correlated with the difference between probability and 
surprise. The implications for models of surprise are 
discussed. 
Keywords: Surprise, probability, likelihood judgments, 
expectation, representation, reasoning. 
Introduction 
Surprise is a familiar experience to us all, whether induced 
by a noise in the dark, or by an unexpected twist in a murder 
mystery. Due to its pervasiveness, surprise has been a topic 
of interest for researchers in psychology and its cognate 
disciplines for quite some time (e.g. Darwin, 1872). This 
research has shown that, as well as being one of the most 
basic and universal of human emotions, surprise has many 
important cognitive ramifications (Fisk, 2002; Meyer, 
Reisenzein & Schützwohl, 1997; Ortony & Partridge, 1987; 
Schützwohl, 1998; Teigen & Keren, 2003). For example, a 
surprising event, as well as giving rise to a ‘feeling of 
surprise’ at a subjective and physiological level, usually 
results in an interruption to ongoing activities and an 
increased focusing of attention on the event in question (e.g. 
Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 1999). As such, one hypothesis 
is that surprise plays a key role in learning and prediction: it 
interrupts activity to focus one’s attention on why the 
surprising event occurred in the first place, so that a similar 
event may be predicted and avoided in the future (Darwin, 
1872; Meyer et al. 1997).  
In spite of the considerable research that has been 
conducted on the subjective and behavioural ramifications 
of surprise and the important role it plays in difference 
contexts, it is not clear how and when a person becomes 
surprised. In this article, we attempt to shed light on this 
issue by investigating the factors which cause an event to be 
perceived as surprising. In particular, we seek to explain the 
difference between probability and surprise judgments. Why 
do some unlikely events elicit surprise, while others do not? 
Surprise as Probability 
A review of the literature reveals that the prevailing 
definition of surprise relates it directly to expectation (e.g. 
Meyer et al, 1997; Ortony & Partridge, 1987; Teigen & 
Keren, 2003). Indeed, this view corresponds to people’s 
own naïve understanding of the phenomenon (e.g. Bartsch 
& Estes, 1997, found that both children and adults 
conceptualise surprise in terms of expectation). 
Theoretically, expectation is formalised in terms of 
probabilities, where an unexpected outcome is considered to 
be a low probability event, and vice-versa (Teigen & Keren, 
2003). If we relate this to surprise, then low probability 
events should lead to a feeling of surprise, while high 
probability events should not. 
While there has been some empirical support for this 
view (e.g. Fisk, 2002; Itti & Baldi, 2006; Reisenzein, 2000), 
the intuitive relationship between probability and surprise 
does not always hold. Most of the events that occur in 
everyday life are quite unlikely based on prior knowledge, 
yet their occurrence does not always lead to surprise. Teigen 
and Keren (2003) carried out a number of experiments 
which illustrated a divergence between probability and 
surprise.  Participants rated both the probability of a certain 
event and also how surprised they would be if the event 
were to occur. In one study, for instance, participants were 
presented with a scenario that described Erik, an athlete who 
was competing in a 5,000m race. One set of participants 
were told that, with two laps to go, all the athletes in the 
race – including Erik – were running together in a large 
group (multiple alternatives condition). Another set of 
participants were told that Erik was in second place, lagging 
behind a lead athlete with the rest of the athletes far behind 
(single alternative condition). Both groups were then asked 
to rate the probability of Erik winning the race, and how 
surprised they would be if he won. While participants in the 
single alternative condition (where Erik was in second 
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place) correctly rated the probability of Erik winning the 
race as higher than those in the multiple alternative 
condition (where all the athletes were in one group), they 
also rated this possibility as being more surprising.  
To explain this effect, Teigen and Keren (2003) 
proposed the contrast hypothesis of surprise. This theory 
holds that surprise is governed by the relative probabilities 
of alternative events, rather than by the absolute probability 
of the observed outcome. When there are multiple 
alternatives to an outcome (i.e. when any of the athletes, 
including Erik, has a chance of winning the race), 
participants should be less surprised at Erik winning than if 
there is just one likely alternative outcome (i.e. when only 
one other athlete – the lead runner – is likely to win). 
According to Teigen and Keren (2003), this is because the 
‘contrast’ between the observed and the expected outcome 
is greater in the latter version of the scenario.  
Teigen and Keren’s (2003) contrast hypothesis has 
greater scope than the probability-based view, since it 
explains why many events, which have a low probability of 
occurring, do not lead to surprise. However, the theory only 
applies to situations in which explicit expectations are 
formed. This is a significant limitation as, intuitively, most 
surprise reactions do not contradict prior expectations (e.g. a 
brick coming through the window). In order to subsume 
these alternative forms of surprises into a single 
comprehensive theory, a more general explanation is 
required.  
Surprise as Sense-making 
Kahneman and Miller (1986) originally proposed that 
surprise reflects a person’s success, or more appropriately 
their failure, to make sense of an event. In line with this 
view, Maguire, Maguire and Keane (2007) proposed that the 
experience of surprise reflects a representation updating 
process. Maintaining a current and valid representation of 
the environment is of utmost importance to any organism in 
order to allow it to act appropriately; allowing it to diverge 
from reality can have serious consequences. Maguire et al.’s 
integration hypothesis proposes that surprise occurs when a 
coherent representation ‘breaks down’ in light of a 
discrepant stimulus. In such cases it makes sense to focus 
attention immediately on the event so that appropriate action 
can be taken as soon as possible 
People are constantly updating their representations in 
very minor ways. For example, a person’s attention tends to 
be directed towards information which is least congruent 
with their representation: Itti and Baldi (2006) found that 
84% of gaze shifts were directed towards locations that were 
more surprising when participants were shown television 
and video games. The best strategy for incorporating a 
discrepant event is to direct additional cognitive resources 
towards it and to sample additional information from the 
environment. For that reason, the emotional state of surprise 
is generally accompanied by physiological arousal, as well 
as distinctive changes in facial expression, such as eye-
widening and the opening of the mouth. Darwin (1872) 
originally proposed that these changes prepare an organism 
to react. Susskind et al. (2008) suggested that the facial 
expression associated with surprise has evolved to enhance 
the intake of sensory information. They found that 
participants with wide-open eyes detected peripheral objects 
more quickly and performed side-to-side eye movements 
faster. The nasal cavity was also enlarged, enhancing the 
absorption of odours and allowing participants to take in 
more air with each breath without exerting any extra effort.  
Once the physiological surprise response has subsided, 
the urge to understand a discrepant event persists. Imagine 
finding a gorilla in your car. At first you would be taken 
aback, experiencing the physiological changes associated 
with a surprise reaction. After calling the zoo to have the 
gorilla removed, this initial emotional response would 
subside, yet the urge to reconcile this bizarre event with 
your representation of reality would persist nonetheless 
(how on earth did the gorilla get into the car?) We maintain 
that this form of ‘cognitive surprise’ is driven by the same 
conditions which give rise to the more visceral form of 
surprise, namely the need to maintain a valid representation 
of reality. If both forms of surprise are manifestations of the 
same underlying phenomenon, then they should be 
explained by a single unified theory.  
In this article we argue that the integration hypothesis 
encompasses the predictions of Teigen and Keren’s contrast 
hypothesis as well as accounting for other forms of surprise 
that do not involve explicit expectations. Importantly, the 
integration hypothesis also provides a strong theoretical 
motivation for the phenomenon of surprise, as opposed to 
explaining it in terms of other measures such as probability.   
Experiment 1 
If people insisted on understanding the causal factors giving 
rise to all events in their environment, then every 
subjectively low probability event would elicit surprise. 
However, representations involving this level of detail are 
not required. Some events will be inconsequential to the 
interests of the individual and thus can be ignored. Other 
events are simply not amenable to explanation because the 
causal factors are extremely convoluted. Consequently, 
much of the information in a representation may be 
generalised in terms of frequencies rather than in terms of 
precise explanatory factors. For example, rather than 
scrupulously monitoring and modelling the atmospheric 
conditions which give rise to precipitation, most people will 
simply accept that it rains sporadically. Similarly, in a 
lottery draw, people will accept that a set of unpredictable 
random numbers will be drawn, rather than for example, 
furiously trying to explain why the number 36 happened to 
emerge. As a result of these generalisations, events can 
occur which, while recognised as having been relatively 
unlikely, do not require representational updating. The 
integration hypothesis therefore predicts that differences in 
surprise and probability judgments arise because of 
differences in representational specificity. 
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In the following experiment we investigated the validity 
of this premise. Participants were asked to provide 
judgments for four different representations of a weather 
system. The descriptions were varied according to 
specificity and also according to the extent to which they 
supported the outcome. The aim of the experiment was to 
investigate whether the specificity of a representation affects 
the level of surprise experienced for subjectively low 
probability events. 
Method 
Participants 84 undergraduate students from NUI 
Maynooth participated voluntarily in this experiment. All 
were native English speakers. 
 
Materials The four weather representations generated were 
general-supportive (‘it rains five days a week’), general-
unsupportive (‘it rains one day a week’), specific-supportive 
(‘a cold front approaching from the west will lead to 
overcast, unsettled weather over the next few days’) and 
specific-unsupportive (‘an approaching area of high 
pressure will bring clear, sunny conditions over the next few 
days’). 
 
Design We used a two-way repeated-measures model. The 
independent variables of specificity and support were 
repeated by participant, with probability and surprise 
judgments as the dependent variables.  
 
Procedure For all scenarios, participants were asked to 
provide both surprise and probability judgments for the 
possibility of rain the following day. Surprise ratings were 
provided on a 7-point scale (7 being the most surprising), 
while probability was rated in terms of a percentage (100% 
reflecting certainty). The order of presentation of the 
scenarios was randomised between participants, as was the 
order in which they rated surprise and probability. 
Results and Discussion 
Some of the participants failed to reason probabilistically. 
For example, in the scenario “it rains one day a week”, the 
probability of rain on a given day must be 14%. However, 
some participants provided much higher probability ratings, 
indicating that they were relying on sense-making rather 
than on frequency information for their judgments. In other 
words, they were confusing mathematical probability with 
surprise. Given that the aim of the experiment was to 
elucidate the difference between probability and surprise, 
these participants could not be included in the study. 
Accordingly, we eliminated the responses of any participant 
who rated the probability for the abstract-unsupportive 
scenario as higher than 20%. This removed a total of 23 
participants, 12 of whom had rated surprise first and 11 of 
whom had rated probability first. The average probability 
rating provided by these participants for the abstract-
unsupportive condition was 61%, varying from 30% (4 
participants) up to 90% (3 participants). The extent of this 
logical error indicates that people are prone to relying on 
representation-fit for making likelihood judgments, even 
when explicit frequency information is available.  
The average probability ratings are provided in Table 1. 
Both the general-unsupportive and the specific-unsupportive 
scenarios were rated as similarly improbable (15% and 16% 
respectively), yet the specific-unsupportive scenario was 
rated as twice as surprising as the general-unsupportive 
scenario (5.2 and 2.6 respectively). We conducted repeated 
measures ANOVAs examining the relationship between 
specificity, probability and surprise. Probability ratings were 
not affected by representational specificity: The specificity 
X supportiveness interaction was not significant, F(1,58) = 
.241, p = .626, MSe = 179.621. As expected, there was a 
significant main effect of supportiveness, F(1,58) = 
2360.673, p < .001, MSe = 97.946, though no significant 
effect of specificity, F(1,58) = .1.019, p = .317, MSe = 
174.693. The surprise ratings displayed a different pattern of 
results. In this case, there was a strong interaction between 
specificity and supportiveness, F(1,58) = 70.188, p < .001, 
MSe = 1.235. There was a significant main effect of 
supportiveness, F(1,58) = 186.47, p < .001, MSe = 1.744, as 
well as a significant main effect of specificity, F(1,58) = 
100.97, p < .001, MSe = 1.115, with the general-
unsupportive scenario being rated as far less surprising than 
the specific-unsupportive scenario.  
In order to better analyse the effect of specificity on the 
difference between surprise and probability ratings, we 
converted both to a single scale and subtracted one from the 
other, yielding a total difference score. As shown in Table 1, 
surprise and probability ratings diverged markedly for the 
general-unsupportive scenario (59%) but were relatively 
consistent for the other three scenarios (16%, 11% and 
15%). We computed a two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
on the difference values. Again, there was a significant 
interaction between specificity and supportiveness, F(1,58) 
= 83.669, p < .001, MSe = 392.886, with a significant main
 
Table 1 
Mean probability and surprise ratings for Experiment 1 
 
Order of ratings 
General-Supportive General-Unsupportive Specific-Supportive Specific-Unsupportive 
Probability Surprise Probability Surprise Probability Surprise Probability Surprise 
Probability first 77% 1.3 15% 2.6 83% 1.6 17% 5.1 
Surprise first 76% 1.6 14% 2.6 76% 1.6 15% 5.2 
Mean 77% 1.5 15% 2.6 79% 1.6 16% 5.2 
Difference 15.9% 58.7% 10.5% 14.6% 
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effect of supportiveness, F(1,58) = 54.000, p < .001, MSe = 
514.823, as well as a significant main effect of specificity, 
F(1,58) = 44.111, p < .001, MSe = 406.838. Pairwise 
comparisons using Bonferroni adjustments revealed that 
there was a significant difference between the general-
unsupportive condition and the other three conditions (all ps 
< .0083) but no other significant differences within these 
three.  
These results illustrate clearly that generalised 
representations can lead to lower levels of surprise for 
subjectively low probability outcomes. Although 
participants acknowledged that it was unlikely to rain the 
following day in the general-unsupportive scenario (15%), 
they would not have been very surprised if it did rain (2.6 
out of 7).  This observation is in line with the integration 
hypothesis, which predicts that surprise should be lower 
when low probability events can be easily integrated 
without requiring representational updating. For example, 
the occurrence of rain on a particular day does not 
undermine the representation that it rains one day each 
week. 
The observed pattern of results suggests that differences 
in surprise and probability can be linked to the specificity of 
the representations on which such judgments are based. The 
more specific a representation, the less likely it is to be 
compatible with low probability events, causing surprise 
and probability ratings to converge. In idiosyncratic 
situations which are not amenable to generalisation, 
people’s representations are likely to be over-fitted and less 
able to accommodate subjectively low probability 
outcomes. In this case, anything that deviates from 
expectation will require a fundamental re-evaluation of the 
representation. For example, Reisenzein (2000) asked 
participants to rate confidence and surprise for answers on a 
multiple-choice test and found a very strong correlation 
between these measures (r = -0.78). The likelihood of being 
correct about a particular multiple-choice question is 
difficult to generalise. If you are confident that you know 
the answer to a particular question and are subsequently 
shown to be incorrect (a subjectively low probability event), 
then there is a need to update to your beliefs in order to 
prevent subsequent errors of judgment. Unlike the situation 
involving the weather, a generalisation in this case is 
unacceptable. 
Integration or Anticipation? 
The pattern of results observed in Experiment 1 could 
potentially be accommodated by the contrast hypothesis. 
For example, it could feasibly be claimed that the general-
unsupportive representation did not contradict any 
expectation, while the specific-supportive representation 
contradicted the expectation that there would be clear, sunny 
weather. Because expectations and anticipatory processes 
are by definition based on one’s current representation of 
reality, events which contrast with an explicit expectation 
will necessarily be events which are difficult to 
accommodate. Typically, the greater the contrast, the more 
difficult the integration process. As a result, the contrast and 
integration hypotheses make similar predictions for 
representations which are specific enough to set up an 
expectation. 
A significant limitation of Teigen and Keren’s (2003) 
contrast hypothesis is that the range of potential outcome 
events in a given situation can rarely be divided up in terms 
of a discrete number of competing alternatives. As a result, 
most instances of surprise cannot be explained in terms of 
contrast. For example, if you are sitting on the couch 
watching television and a brick comes through the window, 
it is difficult to construe this event as being in contrast with 
the expectation that a brick would not come through the 
window. People do not usually sit in their living room 
thinking about bricks, yet they would certainly be surprised 
if they saw one coming towards them. According to the 
integration hypothesis, the range of possible outcomes is so 
great that events are typically evaluated after they have 
occurred, as part of a sense-making process, rather than 
being predicted beforehand. The potential for events to be 
judged as surprising or unsurprising is usually implicit to a 
representation. In other words, people do not always have 
well-formed expectations about what is going to happen 
next. What they do have is a representation which can be 
used to make sense of the events that happen to unfold. In 
other words, reality does the hard work of figuring out what 
happens next and people do the easier work of trying to 
make sense of it. 
If the integration hypothesis is correct, then it should be 
possible for events to simultaneously violate expectations 
and be judged as unsurprising, provided some effective way 
of rationalising those events is established. For example, 
although it might be surprising to find that a trailing runner 
wins a race (as in Teigen and Keren’s example), it should 
seem less surprising when a convincing explanation is 
provided (e.g. the leader stumbles). Maguire and Keane 
(2006) investigated this possibility, creating 16 scenarios 
which instantiated an explicit expectation and then 
analysing surprise ratings provided for a set of different 
outcomes. In the Confirm condition the outcome confirmed 
the expectation set up by the representation while in the 
Disconfirm condition the outcome disconfirmed that 
expectation. In the Disconfirm-Enable condition, the 
disconfirming outcome was paired with another enabling 
event which facilitated the overall integration of the 
conjunctive outcome with the representation. For example, 
one of the scenarios described Anna setting her radio alarm 
clock for 7am in preparation for an important job interview 
the next morning. In the Disconfirm condition, participants 
were asked to rate surprise for the outcome that the alarm 
clock failed to ring. In the Disconfirm-Enable condition, 
they were asked to rate surprise for the outcome that there 
was a power-cut during the night and the alarm clock failed 
to ring. 
Maguire and Keane (2006) found that the Disconfirm-
Enable outcomes were rated as significantly less surprising 
than those in the Disconfirm condition. In other words, 
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when participants were provided with a reason for why an 
unexpected event might occur, their surprise was lower than 
when the disconfirming event was presented on its own. 
These findings undermine the contrast hypothesis, as they 
demonstrate that the same unexpected event is not always 
judged as equally surprising in different contexts. Instead, 
surprise for an unexpected event is mitigated when a means 
for rationalising that event is made available.  
Maguire and Keane’s (2006) findings could potentially 
be reconciled with the contrast hypothesis. One could make 
the case that having an explanation for a disconfirming 
event lowers the perceived level of contrast between that 
event and the expected outcome because the outcome seems 
more likely. Tverksy and Kahneman (1983) demonstrated 
that a conjunction of associated propositions are often rated 
as more probable than either proposition in isolation. Thus, 
knowing that an alarm clock failed to ring because of a 
power failure may reduce the level of contrast with the 
expectation that it should have rung at the appropriate time. 
The key difference between the contrast hypothesis and the 
integration hypothesis centres on whether or not people 
develop expectations against which subsequent outcomes 
are contrasted. While the contrast hypothesis posits that 
expectations are a key factor in the experience of surprise, 
the integration hypothesis claims that surprise can be 
modelled based on the outcome event alone. In the 
following experiment we investigated whether or not 
surprise ratings are associated with differences in contrast. 
Experiment 2 
One limitation of Teigen and Keren’s (2003) study was that 
they did not provide any specific measurements of contrast. 
In each experiment, a single scenario was presented to 
participants involving a pair of conditions which were 
assumed to reflect high and low levels of contrast. Although 
Teigen and Keren reported significant differences, no 
measure was provided of the overall correlation between 
contrast and surprise. We addressed this lacuna by deriving 
levels of contrast for Maguire and Keane’s 16 scenarios and 
comparing them against the corresponding surprise ratings. 
Teigen and Keren stated that the “surprise associated with 
an outcome is determined by the relative, rather than 
absolute probabilities involved” (p. 58). Accordingly, 
contrast was calculated by obtaining probability ratings for 
the confirming and disconfirming outcomes and subtracting 
them.  
The contrast hypothesis predicts that the level of contrast 
should be closely correlated with surprise ratings. On the 
other hand, the integration hypothesis maintains that 
surprise is based solely on the ease with which an event can 
be integrated. As demonstrated in Experiment 1, 
subjectively low probability outcomes are less easily 
integrated with representations which are specific enough to 
instantiate an explicit expectation. In such situations, 
probability and surprise ratings tend to converge. 
Accordingly, the integration hypothesis suggests that 
probability and surprise ratings should be closely matched 
for the scenarios under investigation. 
 
Method 
Participants 120 undergraduate students from NUI 
Maynooth voluntarily took part in the experiment. All were 
native English speakers. 
 
Materials The 16 event sequences generated by Maguire et 
al. (2006) were used, with the three conditions Confirm, 
Disconfirm and Disconfirm-Enable.  
 
Design The three conditions were counterbalanced across 
three lists of scenarios. Each participant was given one of 
these lists which contained the 16 scenarios paired with one 
of the three endings.  
 
Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to judge 
either probability or surprise. In the probability condition, 
the scenario body was followed by the question “What is 
the probability that: X ?”, where X referred to the event, or 
series of events, corresponding to one of the three possible 
outcomes. In the surprise condition, the question was “How 
surprised would you be if: X ?”. As before, surprise ratings 
were provided on a 7-point scale, while probability was 
rated in terms of a percentage. The scenarios were presented 
in a different random order to each participant. 
Results and Discussion 
The average probability ratings were 75.8%, 14.6% and 
20.5% for the Confirm, Disconfirm and Disconfirm-Enable 
conditions respectively and the average surprise ratings 
were 1.9, 4.9 and 4.5. The Disconfirm-Enable condition was 
rated as more probable than the Disconfirm condition for 13 
of the 16 scenarios. There was a significant difference 
between these conditions, indicating a robust conjunction 
fallacy effect, F1(1,15) = 5.980, p = .027, MSe = 47.165, (see 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The average level of contrast 
for the Disconfirm scenarios (61.2%) was significantly 
greater than the average level of contrast for the Disconfirm-
Enable condition (55.3%),  F1(1,15) = 5.872, p = .029, MSe 
= 48.031. This observation lends support to the idea that 
Maguire and Keane’s (2006) findings can be explained in 
terms of contrast. 
We computed the degree of contrast for both conditions 
by subtracting the probability ratings from those of the 
corresponding confirming scenarios. There was no 
significant correlation between contrast and the surprise 
ratings, r = .113, p = .537. However, as predicted by the 
integration hypothesis, there was a significant correlation 
between the probability and surprise ratings, r = -.418, p = 
.017. All but one of the 16 scenarios displayed the same 
direction of difference between the Disconfirm and 
Disconfirm-Enable conditions for both surprise and 
probability ratings, indicating a close relationship. 
These results indicate that differences in contrast are not 
associated with differences in surprise: low probability 
events can be just as surprising when a scenario does not 
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support a clear expectation. For example, the lowest 
probability ratings for any confirming outcome were 
provided for the scenario where Sarah calls to her parents’ 
house and knocks on the front door. Because either one of 
her parents must open the door, the probability of the most 
likely outcome cannot exceed 50% (assuming no bias 
towards either parent). Although this substantially lowers 
the potential contrast with any alternative outcome, it does 
not necessarily lower the surprise for a low probability 
event: a stranger opening the door is just as surprising, 
regardless of the probability of the most likely possible 
alternative. 
One might claim that the expectation in this case is that 
either one of Sarah’s parents will answer the door and that 
the level of contrast should be computed on this basis. In 
order to make this argument, one would have to concede 
that an expectation can maintain some degree of ambiguity. 
However, this is exactly what our proposal of a generalised 
representation is intended to reflect: people allow a certain 
level of flexibility in their representations of the world so 
that a broad range of potential outcomes can be 
accommodated. Because they do not seek to model every 
last detail, people’s representations are primarily used for 
making sense of rather than for predicting events.  
Conclusion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that differences in 
representational specificity lead to differences between 
surprise and probability judgments. Experiment 2 
demonstrated that the level of contrast between an 
expectation and an outcome is not correlated with the 
difference between surprise and probability ratings. These 
results provide converging evidence in support of the 
integration hypothesis while undermining the contrast 
hypothesis. Because expectation-supporting representations 
tend to be specific, Teigen and Keren’s experimental 
conditions varied considerably in specificity. Thus, it seems 
likely that the effect observed by Teigen and Keren (2003) 
was most likely due to differences in representational 
specificity rather than differences in contrast per se. 
The fact that surprise is a relatively infrequent 
phenomenon demonstrates that people maintain extremely 
accurate representations that adapt readily to unfolding 
events. However, the assumption of the contrast hypothesis 
that events are continuously predicted by these 
representations trivialises the complexity of the environment 
and overstates the level of detail that can be represented. 
Because real world events are often so unpredictable, 
generating explicit expectations is seldom practical or even 
feasible. An unfortunate individual adopting the 
expectation-making strategy would live their life in a state 
of perpetual surprise.  
Accordingly, we have proposed that people maintain 
representations which, although not sufficiently detailed to 
make explicit predictions, can be relied on to make sense of 
events. A generalised representation allows much of the 
environment’s variability to be captured in a succinct 
manner, while ignoring irrelevant details. Because low 
probability events can be congruent with a generalised 
representation, they do not necessarily require 
representational updating and hence do not always elicit 
surprise. In conclusion, we have provided converging 
evidence that differences between probability and surprise 
arise not because of contrasts between outcomes and 
expectations, but because representations can be generalised 
to facilitate the integration of subjectively low probability 
events. 
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